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A B S T R A C T
COVID-19 in the UK has been characterised by periods of exponential growth and decline, as different non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) are brought into play. During the early uncontrolled phase of the outbreak
(March 2020) there was a period of prolonged exponential growth with epidemiological observations such as
hospitalisation doubling every 3–4 days. The enforcement of strict lockdown measures led to a noticeable
decline in all epidemic quantities that slowed during the summer as control measures were relaxed. From
August 2020, infections, hospitalisations and deaths began rising once more and various NPIs were applied
locally throughout the UK in response.
Controlling any rise in infection is a compromise between public health and societal costs, with more
stringent NPIs reducing cases but damaging the economy and restricting freedoms. Typically, NPI imposition
is made in response to the epidemiological state, are of indefinite length and are often imposed at short
notice, greatly increasing the negative impact. An alternative approach is to consider planned, limited duration
periods of strict NPIs aiming to purposefully reduce prevalence before such emergency NPIs are required. These
‘‘precautionary breaks’’ may offer a means of keeping control of the epidemic, while their fixed duration and the
forewarning may limit their societal impact. Here, using simple analysis and age-structured models matched to
the UK SARS-CoV-2 epidemic, we investigate the action of precautionary breaks. In particular we consider their
impact on the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infection, as well as the total number of predicted hospitalisations
and deaths caused by COVID-19 disease. We find that precautionary breaks provide the biggest gains when
the growth rate is low, but offer a much needed brake on increasing infection when the growth rate is higher,
potentially allowing other measures to regain control.1. Introduction
The novel coronavirus virus strain that arose in Wuhan city in
China in late 2019 has had a dramatic effect on the lives of people
worldwide. By 1st October 2020, we had passed the grim milestone of
1 million deaths worldwide and over 30 million cases (World Health
Organization, 2020). In the absence of disease specific treatments or
prophylactic measures, most countries have adopted social distancing
measures (reducing the number of potentially risky contacts) and a
range of other interventions (such as mask use and promoting good
hand hygiene) as a means of control (Hale et al., 2020). The op-
timal level of such non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) requires
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a careful balance between public health and economic needs, from
which it could be argued that the optimal strategy is one that min-
imises economic disruption while still preventing exponential growth
of infection (Rowthorn and Maciejowski, 2020).
In the UK, the first cases of COVID-19 were reported on 31st January
2020 in the city of York. Cases continued to be reported sporadically
throughout February and by the end of the month guidance was issued
stating that travellers from the high-risk epidemic hotspots of Hubei
province in China, Iran and South Korea should self-isolate upon arrival
in the UK. By mid-March 2020, as the number of cases clearly began tovailable online 2 December 2021
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rise, there was advice against all non-essential travel and, over the com-
ing days, several social-distancing measures were introduced including
the closing of schools, non-essential shops, pubs and restaurants. This
culminated in the introduction of a UK ‘‘lockdown’’, announced on the
evening of 23rd March 2020, whereby the public were asked to remain
at home with four exceptions: shopping for essentials; any medical
emergency; for one form of exercise per day; and to travel to work
if absolutely necessary. By mid-April 2020, these stringent mitigation
strategies began to have a noticeable effect, as the number of confirmed
cases, hospitalisations and deaths as a result of the disease began to
decline (Flaxman et al., 2020; Davies et al., 2020). As the number of
daily confirmed cases continued to decline during April, May and into
June 2020 (Riley et al., 2020b), measures to ease lockdown restric-
tions began, with the re-opening of some non-essential businesses and
allowing small groups of individuals from different households to meet
up outdoors, whilst maintaining some measure of social distancing
and compliance with NPIs. This was followed by gradually re-opening
primary schools in England from 1st June 2020 and all non-essential
retail outlets from 15th June 2020.
The dynamics throughout the summer of 2020 were characterised
by the emergence of hot-spots of persistent infection and higher than
average growth rates, with such areas facing additional local controls.
Notably, Leicester and the Greater Manchester conurbation were iden-
tified as regions where the number of identified cases per hundred
thousand had increased to high levels, while the infection in many
other areas was still in decline. By mid to late August 2020, there was
some evidence that the national underlying growth rate had become
positive (Riley et al., 2020b), and by the end of September exponential
growth had returned in almost all regions (Anderson et al., 2020; Riley
et al., 2020a). Like many countries, the UK attempted to curtail growth
by introducing stricter controls in the form of localised measures, as
a national ‘‘lockdown’’ can be very disruptive to multiple elements
of society (Pierce et al., 2020; Office for National Statistics, 2020),
especially given that the duration of lockdown restrictions is largely
unpredictable to the local populous and businesses.
One potential mechanism of regaining control is to introduce a
short period of intense measures to substantially reduce cases — this
has been dubbed a ‘circuit breaker’ although ‘‘precautionary break’’
is a more apposite name. It is hoped that by driving infections to
a sufficiently low level, other measures such as test-trace-and-isolate
will have greater capacity to prevent the spread of infection (Davis
et al., 2021). In common with other resource limited controls (Cooper
et al., 2004), we expect test-trace-and-isolate to be most effective when
the level of infection is relatively low (Kretzschmar et al., 2020).
Alternatively, driving infections to low levels would give time for a
concerted vaccination programme to build sufficient population-level
immunity (Moore et al., 2021a). Additionally, a short lockdown period
would limit the economic costs of such a measure (Karin et al., 2020;
Tildesley et al., 2021).
In this paper, we consider the application of precautionary breaks
to the UK, aligning a two-week period of intense control to school half-
term holidays in order to minimise educational disruption. We retain
the context of the initial analysis, focusing on control of the second
wave of infection in late 2020, but also consider the implications for
contemporary control. We utilise both a simple illustrative analysis and
an age-structured SARS-CoV-2 transmission model fitted to the UK data,
to investigate the likely impact of a break on the trajectory of infection
and the subsequent numbers of hospitalised cases and deaths.
2. Simple analysis
Under the simplifying assumption that without additional control2
measures cases will increase exponentially at rate 𝑟(> 0), but during theperiod of the precautionary break cases will decrease at a rate −𝑠(< 0),







𝐼0 exp(𝑟𝑡) 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝐼0 exp(𝑟𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡) exp(−𝑠(𝑡 − 𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡)) 𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑
𝐼0 exp(𝑟𝑡) exp(−(𝑟 + 𝑠)(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑 − 𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡)) 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑
here 𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 and 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑 define the start and end dates of the breaks. From
this analysis, we observed two key effects of a short-term lockdown.
Firstly, it causes a relative reduction in the level of infection by a
factor 𝐵 = 1 − exp(−(𝑟 + 𝑠)(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑 − 𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡)), compared to not having the
precautionary break. In principle, this should translate into a similar
reduction in the daily number of hospitalisations and deaths — the two
epidemiological measures of most concern. We can also conceptualise
this reduction as taking the epidemic back in time to when there were
fewer cases; this temporal reset, 𝑇𝑅, is given by:






Taken together these two metrics 𝐵 and 𝑇𝑅 imply that such breaks,
nsurprisingly, have the greatest impact when they are long in duration
nd lead to a rapid decline in cases (𝑠 large). The impact of the
ncontrolled growth rate, 𝑟, is more ambiguous. When 𝑟 is large the
mpact of the precautionary break on the level of infection is more
ronounced as it prevents a period of high exponential growth. In
ontrast, large 𝑟 reduces the size of the temporal reset as it does not
ake many days of exponential growth to cancel the decline expected
uring the break.
. Age-structured model description
We now wish to increase the realism of the modelling framework
o more accurately capture the impact of such precautionary breaks
n the number of hospitalisations and deaths as a result of infection,
hich requires an age-structured model matched to the wealth of
pidemiological data (Keeling et al., 2021, 2020). Even though we have
ramatically increased the complexity of the model, the two simple
etrics (𝐵 and 𝑇𝑅) remain of key interest.
The age-structured SARS-CoV-2 transmission model and its match-
ng to the UK data has been described in detail elsewhere (Keeling
t al., 2021, 2020) from which a simplified version of the code is now
vailable (Moore et al., 2021b). Here, for completeness, we provide
basic review of the main salient points with more detail given in
he Supplementary Material. The model is an ODE formulation based
round SEIR-type dynamics and incorporating five-year age classes.
he infectious class is subdivided into symptomatic and asymptomatic
nfections, with symptomatic infections having greater transmission
nd being more common in older individuals. In addition, we base
ransmission between age-groups on POLYMOD-style age-mixing matri-
es (Prem et al., 2020), together with age-dependent susceptibility to
enerate the observed age distribution of cases. The model also includes
dditional structure to account for quarantining of identified cases and
solation of their household (Keeling et al., 2021).
The model is calibrated against different sources of epidemiological
ata including hospital admissions and occupancy, ICU occupancy,
eaths within 28-days of a positive COVID test, age-structured serol-
gy from blood donors and the proportion of pillar 2 (community)
ests that are positive (Keeling et al., 2020). This matching is done
eparately for the seven NHS regions in England (East of England,
ondon, Midlands, North East & Yorkshire, North West, South East
nd South West) and for the three devolved nations (Northern Ireland,
cotland and Wales); although some parameters which we believe
re properties of the pathogen and not host behaviour (such as the
elative transmission rate from asymptomatic infections) are the same
cross all regions. We performed the parameter inference within a
ayesian MCMC framework, with the likelihood (our objective func-
ion) determined by assuming the daily epidemiological observations
Epidemics 37 (2021) 100526M.J. Keeling et al.Fig. 1. Impact of a two-week precautionary break during half-term on the infection dynamics. For a range of assumed growth rates in September and October 2020 (and
associated R values, assuming a generation time of around 4.3 days), we illustrate both the reduction in infection (𝐵) and the temporal reset (𝑇𝑅) of a break starting on 24th
October 2020. Each line corresponds to a different strength of control during the two week precautionary break, which is linked to observed epidemic declines.are Poisson distributed (for hospital admissions, hospital occupancy,
ICU occupancy and deaths) or binomially distributed (for serology and
pillar 2 test) with a mean given by the ODEs (Keeling et al., 2020).
Of particular note, to achieve a match to the historical and changing
pattern of regulations, restrictions and behaviour in each region we
employ a single parameter that changes on a weekly basis and rescales
the transmission matrix to generate different growth rates.
The model has been used for a variety of purposes and has been
shown to be in close agreement with the available epidemiological
data (Keeling et al., 2021, 2020; Moore et al., 2021a). However, the
purpose here is to show that a more complex high-dimensional model
generates results that are in broad agreement with the simpler results
rather than generate detailed policy predictions, which would require
a precise set of time-lines, policy objectives and future scenarios.
As such, we consider two distinct forms of simulation. In the first,
we tightly constrain the dynamics (by rescaling the transmission ma-
trix) to have a given growth rate 𝑟 from 1st September 2020, with the
growth rate being estimated by an eigenvector approach. During the
two-week break (24th October–7th November 2020) we again rescale
the transmission matrix to achieved the desired rate of decay −𝑠, before
returning to the pre-break matrix. We performed all simulations using
the median of the posterior parameter estimates from model fitting
performed in September 2020.
In the second set of simulations, we allow more regional hetero-
geneity by fully exploring the posterior parameter estimates. We chose3
1000 samples from the posterior distribution (Keeling et al., 2020),
for each region of the UK, and vary the level of NPIs (outside of
the precautionary break) to achieve a range of growth rates (𝑟). A
two-week break is enacted on 24th October 2020, with the rate of
decline (−𝑠) determined by the maximal level of NPIs over the full
epidemic from March to September 2020 (as estimated in the posterior
parameter distribution); hence introducing far more variability into the
process. We again looked at the temporal reset (𝑇𝑅), defined as the time
difference between the end of the precautionary break and the previous
time when a similar level of infection occurred.
4. Numerical results
To illustrate the simple analytical behaviour in more detail, we pick
a definitive case (Fig. 1): a two-week break from 24th October–7th
November 2020 to coincide with school half-terms (thereby minimising
educational disruption). We consider the relative reduction 𝐵 and the
temporal reset 𝑇𝑅 across a range of positive growth rates 𝑟, from 0.01
to 0.22, with the upper bound corresponding to the highest growth in
March 2020 before controls were enacted. We consider five different
intensities of break (𝑠 = 0, 0.02, 0.045, 0.06 and 0.1) with the first four
approximating the observed exponential decline over different periods
of control (August 2020 UK average, June 2020 UK average, late April
2020 UK average, late April 2020 London estimate), and the latter
corresponding to the observed decline in continental Europe where
Epidemics 37 (2021) 100526M.J. Keeling et al.Fig. 2. Impact of a two-week precautionary break during half-term on the dynamics of the full age-structured model. Results are from a single simulation using the median
of the posterior parameter estimates from model fitting performed in September 2020. The columns are for four different underlying epidemiological growth rates 𝑟 ≈ 0.02, 0.03, 0.05
and 0.07, while within each panel the colours correspond to different rates of decline during the half-term break (from top to bottom in each graph the lines are: dashed black,
no-control 𝑠 = −𝑟; blue 𝑠 = 0; green 𝑠 = 0.02; purple 𝑠 = 0.045; gold 𝑠 = 0.06). The top row shows the number of new infections in the UK, which experiences the most immediate
impact of the break; the middle row shows the number of daily hospitalised infections; while the lower row shows the daily mortality. Inset into each figure are the number of
infections, hospitalisations and deaths over the period 24th October 2020 to 1st January 2021. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)the lockdown restrictions were more intense. We find that, as shown
earlier analytically, the greatest effects are found for stricter controls
during the precautionary break; lower intrinsic growth (𝑟) outside of
the break leads to a longer temporal reset, whereas a higher growth
rate is associated with a bigger relative decline in infection.
For the age-structured model, we initially focus on the temporal
dynamics over the period from August to the end of 2020 (Figs. 2
and 3). The log-scaled version (Fig. 2) makes it clearer to see the
exponential dynamics (which are revealed as straight lines), whereas
the linear-scaled version (Fig. 3) provides a more intuitive picture of
the scale of the outbreak.
For four rates of decline during the break (𝑠 = 0, 0.02, 0.045 and
0.06), which correspond to rates used in Fig. 1 (using the same colour
scheme), we approximate exponential declines in reported cases ob-
served in the first lockdown (late April, 𝑠 ≈ 0.045 in the UK, 𝑠 ≈ 0.06
in London), during June (𝑠 ≈ 0.02 in the UK) and in August (𝑠 ≈ 0 in
UK). These rates of exponential decline are generated by imposing a
sufficiently high level of NPIs during the two week break.
For comparison we also show the dynamics without a two-week
break, but including the standard 1-week half term break for school
children (black dashed line). Although the historic dynamics of the full
age-structured model are matched to the reported pattern of hospital-
isations, cases and deaths, we initially investigate the situation where
the intrinsic growth rate from 1st September to 24th October 2020 is4
set to one of four different growth rates (𝑟 ≈ 0.02, 𝑟 ≈ 0.03, 𝑟 ≈ 0.05
and 𝑟 ≈ 0.07, columns of Figs. 2 and 3). To calibrate the model to
the specified growth rate, we scaled the level of NPIs during this time
period to achieve the desired exponential growth; this level of NPIs is
continued after the precautionary break.
Given the extra realism of the age-structured model, we project
not just the number of infections (top row), but the number of daily
hospitalisations and deaths (middle and bottom row respectively). We
also give the total number of infections, hospitalisations and deaths
between 1st October 2020 and 1st January 2021 as numerical values.
These results from the age-structured model mirror the findings
from the simple analytical framework, but provide greater clarity on
the impact of these breaks on the key epidemiological quantities of
hospitalisations and deaths. Both of these measures lag behind the
changes in infection, and the drop in both quantities after the half-
term break is far smoother than is observed for infection. For all
three measures, it is clear that the temporal reset increases with the
strength of controls during the precautionary break, but decreases with
the growth rate; the reset is also longer and more clearly defined for
infection than for the lagged measures of hospitalisations and deaths.
Looking at the medium term impact of the break (as measured by the
total number of deaths between 24th October 2020 and 1st January
2021), we observe that for low growth rates the strongest levels of NPIs
during the break reduces deaths by approximately 37%. In contrast,
when the growth is high the reduction is approximately 52%.
Epidemics 37 (2021) 100526M.J. Keeling et al.Fig. 3. Impact of a two-week precautionary break during half-term on the dynamics of the full age-structured model. Showing the same results as Fig. 2 but on a linear
scale to highlight the magnitude of the projected epidemics.Fig. 4. Impact of a two-week precautionary break during half-term on the dynamics of the full age-structured model. Each point is from the posterior parameter distribution,
with the level of NPIs from 1st September 2020 onwards varied to generate different underlying growth rates. The decline during the precautionary break is the maximum level of
NPI at any time for the associated posterior parameter set. (a) The temporal reset that captured the time gained by the precautionary break; the red line is the theoretical result
from the simple theoretical model based on the average rate of decline during the precautionary break across all replicates. (b) Relative reduction in deaths between 1st October
2020 and 1st January 2021.The results of Fig. 3 artificially constrain the dynamics to achieve
fixed rates of growth and decline. In Fig. 4 we explore the posterior
parameter set (showing 1000 random samples) and constrain the 2-
week break (from 24th October to 7th November 2020) to have the
maximal level of NPIs estimated for each parameter set — which
generally occurs during the main UK lockdown (March and April 2020).5
We again looked at the temporal reset (𝑇𝑅) defined as the time
difference between the end of the precautionary break and the previous
time when a similar level of infection occurred. The results of these
replicates that include natural parameter and intervention uncertainty
show remarkable agreement with the simple analysis (depicted by the
red line, Fig. 4a). The exception is for the very highest levels of consid-
ered growth rates (𝑟 > 0.07); allowing this level of increase since early
Epidemics 37 (2021) 100526M.J. Keeling et al.Fig. 5. Impact of the Welsh fire-break on reported COVID-19 cases. The blue dots
show the reported new COVID-19 cases by date that the specimen was taken (the
majority of these are Pillar 2 swabs of suspected cases in the community); while the
blue curve gives the 7-day moving average and the dashed lines provide the best
exponential fit to the three distinct intervals. The black bar shows the timing of the
fire-break, while the red bar shows the likely timing of the impact of the break on
reported cases due to the lag between infection and symptoms.
Source: Data from the UK government COVID dashboard (Public Health England, 2021).
September 2020 leads to depletion of the susceptible population, which
brings a greater temporal reset than expected. However, allowing a
growth rate of 𝑟 > 0.07 (a doubling time of less than 10 days) for
a long period is not a viable public health option. We find a similar
pattern when examining the relative reduction in deaths; in keeping
with simple theory there is a rise in the reduction that can be obtained
as the growth rate increases, but this again suffers from the non-linear
effects of susceptible depletion for growth rates above 𝑟 = 0.07.
5. Discussion
The pandemic of SARS-CoV-2, and the number of severe cases of
COVID-19 worldwide, has necessitated the adoption of a range of con-
trol measures in different countries. In the absence of a vaccine or other
medical approaches during the early stages of the pandemic, control
had to rely on often very disruptive non-pharmaceutical interventions
to break the chains of transmission. In the UK, the implementation of
such NPIs during the lockdown period (23rd March–13th May 2020)
reversed the early national increase in hospitalisations and deaths (𝑟 ≈
0.2) and led to a steady decline (𝑟 ≈ −0.05) (Flaxman et al., 2020;
Davies et al., 2020). The gradual relaxing of NPIs generated a slowly
increasing growth rate, which we estimate became positive again (lead-
ing to exponential growth) in mid-August 2020 (Anderson et al., 2020).
Against this backdrop of rising cases, we investigated the benefits of
a planned two-week precautionary break (or ‘circuit-break’), where
strict rules are reapplied in an attempt to drive down cases before
their imposition becomes necessary to prevent health system overload.
Such breaks are not in themselves long-term solutions, but may allow
other methods that work best with low numbers of cases (such as test-
trace-and-isolate) to reassert control. In addition, obtaining low levels
of infection before the start of a vaccination campaign would allow
population-level immunity to be developed through immunisation and
thus suppress further rises in cases.
Both simple analytical approaches and an age-structured model
fit to a range of UK data show that planned precautionary break
could be highly effective short-term control measures. Compared to an
absence of such controls, precautionary breaks generate a reduction in
infection, hospitalisations and deaths, which is most pronounced when
the growth rate is moderately high. This reduction in infection can also
be interpreted as a temporal reset, taking the level of infection back
(in time) to a lower value, allowing greater opportunity for additional
public health measures to be enacted or take effect.6
One clear practical question is whether these results are specific to
SARS-CoV-2 infections and how generalisable the findings are to other
epidemiological setting and hence parameters. If we are dealing with
a single homogeneously mixing population (for example simple SIR-
type models) then the instantaneous reduction in mixing during the
precautionary break will translate into an instantaneous reduction in
transmission and hence a reduction in incidence. Although, as shown
in Fig. 3, the implications for other important health measures (such
as hospital admissions, or deaths) is influenced by the distribution of
delays between infection and severe health consequences. For more
complex models (including the SEIR-type models or age-structured
models) then there can be an additional time delay, even for the
incidence of infection, while the system converges to the new dominant
eigenvector; for most epidemiological systems this should be relatively
quick, occurring within one or two generations. However, none of these
issues are specific to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and we expect that
planned precautionary breaks could be of benefit in many epidemic
scenarios, allowing more time for other measures to come into effect.
Short periods of intense control of SARS-CoV-2 have been examined
by other researchers. These include: the regular periodic use of planned
breaks to minimise SEIR-type infection dynamics (Hindes et al., 2021)
and economic disruption (Karin et al., 2020); the optimal timing of a
single short-duration break to minimise an epidemic (Di Lauro et al.,
2021) which is shown to correspond to the epidemic peak; and the in-
teraction between vaccination and precautionary breaks (Bonsall et al.,
2021). Taken together with our findings these results point to some
important policy implications:
1. Precautionary breaks that generate the most stringent applica-
tion of NPIs are associated with the greatest immediate rates
of declines and, as a consequence, the greatest public health
benefits. Therefore, the success of any action is highly contingent
on the adherence of the populous to the recommendations and
rules; a precautionary break is only effective if there is an av-
erage increase in the level of non-pharmaceutical interventions
across the country.
2. If only a single break can be used to mitigate against an other-
wise uncontrolled epidemic, then the break should be carefully
timed to occur close to the peak (Di Lauro et al., 2021), ef-
fectively splitting the outbreak into two and reducing the peak
pressure on health services.
3. On shorter time scales (such that the growth of the epidemic
remains exponential), we consistently find that the optimal time
for a break is always now; there are no good epidemiological
reasons to delay the break as this will simply push back any
benefits until later, leaving more time for additional cases to
accumulate.
4. The number and timing of any precautionary breaks is always
going to be a compromise between their epidemiological benefits
and the societal and economic disruption they cause. This is one
reason we focused on combining the precautionary break with
the half-term school holidays. However, to define the optimal
balance between reducing infection and disruption requires a
unified objective function (Tildesley et al., 2021), which is likely
to be disease specific.
Some practical implementation of these breaks has already been
trialled. Israel began a short-term precautionary break on 18th Septem-
ber 2020, to coincide with their Rosh Hashanah holiday period, with
stricter measures introduced on 25th September 2020. This came to an
end on 18th October 2020, and led to low numbers of cases throughout
October and November with an associated lower number of deaths after
the appropriate lag.
Within the UK, Wales started its 16-day fire-break controls on
23rd October 2020, while Northern Ireland began a series of tighter
restrictions on 16th October 2020. Examination of the Welsh fire-break
(Fig. 5) shows that cases follow a similar pattern to that illustrated





















































in Figs. 2 and 3, with the precautionary break leading to a period of
exponential decay (𝑠 ≈ 0.04) separating two periods of exponential
growth (𝑟 ≈ 0.04 and 𝑟 ≈ 0.06). While the signal is not as clean as
heoretical model results, the impact of the break is clear, although
here is a lag due to the delay between infection, symptoms and being
wabbed. Of more concern is the evidence of a slightly steeper rise in
ases following the break compared to before the break; whether this
s attributable to the break (individuals ‘compensating’ for two weeks
f limited interactions) or would have occurred regardless (for example
ue to climatic or other factors) remains unclear.
Ultimately, such short-term precautionary breaks will only be ef-
ective if (i) their planned nature helps to minimise the associated
ocietal harms and economic losses, (ii) there is good compliance with
he measures across all regions and sections of society, and (iii) the
eduction in cases is used to regain control and bring the growth rate
ack below zero.
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